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ABSTRACT

THE EFFECT OF AUDITOR REPORTING CHOICE AND AUDIT
COMMITTEE OVERSIGHT STRENGTH ON MANAGEMENT
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE DECISIONS
BY
STEPHEN H. FULLER
DECEMBER 2014

Committee Chair:

Dr. Jennifer Joe

Major Academic Unit:

School of Accounting

Motivated by the current PCAOB proposed standard regarding expansion of the auditor’s
reporting model, this study investigates the effect of auditor reporting choice on
management disclosure decisions. The proposed standard would require auditors to
identify and provide information about the most significant audit and financial reporting
issues encountered during the audit in a new section of the audit report on Critical Audit
Matters (CAMs). I develop theory to predict how auditor choices about reporting on
CAMs might affect manager disclosure decisions. In addition, the study investigates how
the effect of auditor reporting choice on management disclosure decisions depends on a
very important governance structure, the audit committee. I find that management reacts
to the auditor shining a spotlight on a highly uncertain critical accounting estimate by
increasing their own disclosure of the matter and that this effect varies directly with the
strength of the audit committee’s oversight. In addition, I find that as auditors increase
the level of detail provided by the auditor in its CAM reporting, management responds
with increased disclosure. Finally, when the auditor provides a detailed CAM discussion,
it appears that managers are likely to increase disclosure of quantitative information that
would enhance the financial statement user’s ability to quantify the risk in a critical
accounting estimate. The study provides ex ante insights on how a mandated change in
the auditor’s reporting model might affect the level of information provided by
management and received by investors.

ix

I. INTRODUCTION
This study examines how managers’ decisions to disclose information about critical
accounting estimates might be sensitive to whether auditors bring attention to the estimates with
their reporting choices. Investors and regulators contend that auditors have information about
their clients’ financial reporting that investors are demanding (PCAOB 2011b), but that
management is choosing not to disclose (SEC 2003, PCAOB 2011b). The importance of this
issue to investors was highlighted by the failure of financial sector companies to make adequate
disclosure regarding the uncertainty surrounding fair value, which some contend was a major
contributing factor to the global financial crisis experienced in the late 2000s (PCAOB 2011a).
To explore the issue, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) initiated a
project in 2011 addressing how the current auditor’s reporting model might be modified to
provide information of greater value to investors (PCAOB 2011a). Highly debated changes to
the auditor’s reporting model have been proposed that would require auditors to bring heightened
attention to key areas of uncertainty in the financial statements such as critical accounting
estimates. It is important to shed light on how managers might respond to differing levels of
attention brought by auditors to critical accounting estimates by adjusting their own voluntary
disclosure decisions.
Effects of the proposed auditing standard are likely to be influenced by the corporate
governance environment of the firm. Audit committees are a key element of corporate
governance by virtue of their role in the monitoring of financial reporting (Blue Ribbon
Committee 1999; Agoglia et al. 2011). Prior research has consistently found that stronger audit
committees are associated with higher quality financial reporting (Agoglia et al. 2011; Abbott et
al. 2004; Bédard et al. 2004). In the course of the debate over the PCAOB auditor’s reporting
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model project, many audit committee members voiced concerns that expanding the auditor’s
reporting model might have the effect of usurping the audit committee’s responsibility for
investor protection (PCAOB 2011b). However, audit committee oversight is likely to play a
pivotal role in determining how proposed changes to the auditor’s reporting model translate to
changes in the quality of management’s financial disclosure. Audit committees review financial
statements and the auditor’s report prior to their release (Beasley et al. 2009), and management
must consider the audit committee’s reaction to the content of the auditor report. Management’s
sensitivity to the auditor’s reporting choices likely depends on the level of accountability felt by
management to the audit committee. Therefore, I also test whether the impact of the proposed
standard on management disclosure choice is conditional on the strength of the audit
committee’s oversight.
The financial reporting and auditing of critical accounting estimates is an area that has
received widespread attention in recent years due to the importance of these estimates to the
content of financial statements and to the decisions of investors (Griffith et al. 2014). Critical
accounting estimates frequently involve complex estimations and computations which require
significant management judgment (Griffith et al. 2014). The use of critical accounting estimates
is pervasive in many financial reporting settings including fair value reporting, asset impairment
analysis, product warranty and liability reserves and post-employment benefits (Griffith et al.
2014). Due to the uncertainty and subjectivity surrounding critical accounting estimates, there
has been a consistent call by regulators and the markets for management to provide disclosure
complementary to the financial statement presentation to improve financial reporting
transparency (e.g., SEC 2003, PCAOB 2011b). Unfortunately, the broad disclosure of
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uncertainty regarding critical accounting estimates has not been universally forthcoming (SEC
2003; PCAOB 2011b).
The audit process represents an avenue for improving clients’ compliance with the
current SEC regulations regarding disclosure on critical accounting estimates for several reasons.
First, auditors interact with their clients on financial reporting matters as a matter of routine.
This relationship allows auditors to keep abreast of developments in the critical accounting areas
of their clients on a timely basis. Next, if changes contemplated in the proposed standard are
adopted, some stakeholders feel that the expansion of the audit report will provide auditors with
greater leverage to compel clients to provide improved disclosure of critical accounting issues
(PCAOB 2011b). Finally, the PCAOB, by virtue of their inspection powers over audit firms, can
properly motivate the audit firms to make appropriate judgments concerning what client issues
are most important to cover in the expanded audit report (Carcello et al. 2011).
In August 2013, the PCAOB released a proposed auditing standard dealing with the
auditor’s reporting model which required that auditors include in their audit report a section
dealing with “Critical Audit Matters” (CAMs) which “involved the most difficult, subjective, or
complex auditor judgments or posed the most difficulty to the auditor in obtaining sufficient
appropriate audit evidence or forming an opinion on the financial statements” (PCAOB 2013,
6).1 Under the proposed standard, the auditor would be required to disclose information about

The PCAOB project had previously proposed different options for expanding the auditor’s reporting model. Each
of the options provided the potential for auditors to bring increased attention to the area of critical accounting
estimates. The options initially proposed in the project included (i) a new report called the “Auditor’s Discussion
and Analysis” (ADA), (ii) extension of the audit report to cover certain “information outside the financial
statements” or (iii) “required and expanded use of emphasis paragraphs” (PCAOB 2011a, 12). Eventually, a
consensus began to develop among the various stakeholders in the debate around the option involving emphasis of
matter (EOM) paragraphs (PCAOB 2011b, 2012). The CAM approach in the most recent proposal is based directly
on the EOM approach.
1
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each CAM in a new section of the audit report or to state that there are no CAMs (PCAOB
2013). While auditors would be required under the proposed standard to begin reporting on
CAMs, they would still have broad discretion over the level of detailed information provided. In
the course of the debate over expansion of the audit report, auditors have indicated they would
only be supportive of providing factual and objective information (PCAOB 2011b). Other
constituencies in the debate argued that if auditors provide only limited information and mainly
rely on reference to management disclosure, the change would not provide investors with the
information they are demanding (PCAOB 2011b). Therefore, I explore whether the level of
detail provided in the auditor’s reporting on the CAM impacts the manager’s decision to provide
disclosure of information that investors are demanding.
To address my research questions, I conducted an experiment in which participants were
highly experienced public company financial executives, primarily chief financial officers. This
high caliber group of participants was vital given the importance of obtaining reliable ex ante
insights on the proposal from managers that will be directly impacted by the proposed standard.
Participants rated the extent of disclosure they would choose to make related to a critical
accounting estimate made by a hypothetical company as well as the importance of a variety of
specific disclosure elements. I manipulated the auditor reporting choice regarding an accounting
estimate made by the company at three levels: (i) No CAM (control); (ii) Short CAM with a brief
description in the audit report; or (iii) Long CAM with a detailed description in the audit report.
I also manipulated the strength of the audit committee’s oversight at two levels, moderate and
strong. Based on theory grounded in the economics and psychology literatures, I predicted
increases in the level of detail provided in the auditor’s CAM reporting of an issue would lead to
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increased disclosure by managers, with the strongest effect coming in the presence of strong
audit committee oversight.
Consistent with expectations, I found a joint effect of auditor CAM reporting choice and
audit committee oversight strength on manager disclosure decisions. I found that the increase in
the manager’s disclosure resulting from the auditor providing detailed discussion of a CAM was
greatest in the presence of strong audit committee oversight, thus highlighting the continued
importance of the audit committee to the quality of financial reporting. Further, I found that
managers did not increase their disclosure when the auditor included only cursory discussion of
the CAM in its audit report providing support for this concern voiced by some stakeholders in
the debate. I also investigated the specific elements of disclosure a manager considers when
making financial disclosure. I found that elements of disclosure that enhance the ability of
financial statement users to quantify the level of risk in a critical accounting estimate (e.g., range
of, key assumptions in, and sensitivity analysis of the estimate) are more likely to be disclosed
when the auditor increases the spotlight on a critical accounting estimate in its CAM reporting,
and that this effect depends on the strength of the audit committee’s oversight.
The study makes several contributions to regulators, practitioners and accounting
researchers. First, the study provides timely feedback to regulators and stakeholders on the
potential effects of the proposed standard that will inform regulator decision-making. Several
important topics under debate are addressed in the study including the appropriate level of detail
that should be required in the auditor’s CAM reporting and the role of the audit committee in the
evolving financial reporting environment. Next, the study answers the call for experimental
research on how proposed policy changes might impact the nature and quality of financial
reporting (Maines 1994; Beresford 1997). Archival information in the U.S. is not available to
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analyze the impact of the proposed change. Experimental research provides the advantage of
seeing ex ante what might happen in a setting “as if” the change had been implemented (Maines
1994). While several concurrent experimental studies have begun to address the implications of
the proposed standard, most have focused on the areas of auditor legal liability (Kachelmeier et
al. 2014 WP; Backof et al. 2014 WP; Gimbar et al. 2014 WP; Brasel et al. 2014 WP; Brown et
al. 2104 WP) and investor reaction to information in CAMs (Christensen et al. 2014 WP; Sirois
et al. 2014 WP). To my knowledge, this is the first experimental study dealing directly with the
effect of auditor reporting choices on manager disclosure decisions. Finally, the study extends
the accounting literature on the impact of audit committee oversight on the quality of financial
reporting and disclosure (Agoglia et al. 2011; Abbott et al. 2004; Bédard et al. 2004; Kang 2014
WP).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides theory and
hypothesis development, Section III describes the research design, Section IV presents the results
of my study, and Section V concludes.
II. BACKGROUND AND THEORY
2.1 Prior Research on Management Disclosure Choice
Prior research has identified several factors affecting management’s choice to make
disclosure. Much of this research has identified a variety of offsetting incentives influencing
management’s disclosure choice. On one hand, managers have a number of positive incentives
to make greater disclosure. For example, managers might provide higher quality disclosure to
establish a reputation for credibility with investors (Stocken 2000; Beyer et al. 2010) for both
themselves and the firm. Such a reputation can grant a number of economic benefits such as
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higher firm valuation and lower cost of capital (Beyer et al. 2010), and a reduction in litigation
risk (Skinner 1997; Field et al. 2005; Beyer et al. 2010).
On the other hand, managers also have incentives discouraging greater disclosure. First,
since a significant component of management compensation is frequently based on stock price
performance, managers might desire to avoid, or at least postpone, disclosure of bad news to
avoid negative stock price impacts (Beyer et al. 2010). Second, greater disclosure has the
potential for proprietary costs to the firm as competitors could derive information from
disclosure that is detrimental to the firm’s interests (Fischer and Verrecchia 2004; Arya et al.
2009; Beyer et al. 2010).
The presence of these offsetting incentives likely motivates management to seek a level
of disclosure that secures the greatest net benefit of disclosure after considering the costs
incurred as a result of disclosure. It is important to note that managers are influenced in this
judgment by whether investors know that management has private information (Beyer et al.
2010). If investors are thought to know less about management’s possession of private
information, management would be expected to provide less voluntary disclosure of bad news
(Dye 1985; Jung and Kwon 1988; Penno 1997; Pae 2002; Beyer et al. 2010). It is possible that
the changes to the auditor’s reporting model currently proposed might shine a spotlight on key
financial statement areas and inform investors that management has private information it is not
disclosing about these areas. Therefore, it is important to assess the impact that such changes
might have on management’s decision what to disclose as a result.
2.2 PCAOB Project
In June 2011, The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) initiated a
project to explore whether and how the current auditor’s reporting model might be modified to
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provide information of greater value to investors (PCAOB 2011a). Based on the PCAOB’s own
views and outreach activities, the current auditor’s reporting model is primarily seen as a
“pass/fail” model that simply provides reasonable assurance as to whether or not the financial
statements are presented free of material misstatement (PCAOB 2011b). Many investors have
argued that auditors could provide much more useful reporting to investors if their reporting was
expanded to provide additional information on a wide array of areas including critical accounting
estimates and their impact on the financial statements (PCAOB 2011b, 2012). The PCAOB
issued a concept release on the project proposing three different methods by which expanded
auditor reporting might be pursued: (i) the requirement of an “Auditor’s Discussion and
Analysis” (ADA) related to the audit; (ii) extension of the audit report to cover certain
“information outside the financial statements”; or (iii) “required and expanded use of emphasis
paragraphs” (PCAOB 2011a, 12).
The PCAOB conducted extensive debate related to the auditor’s reporting model project
including all the major stakeholders – auditors, management, investors and audit committees.
Auditors, management and the audit committee expressed many concerns about the project, chief
among them that auditors should not be the source of “original information” about the company,
which should remain the responsibility of management (PCAOB 2011b). Each of these
stakeholders largely opposed the concept of an ADA or extension of the audit report to areas
outside the financial statements (e.g., all or part of MDA2) due to concerns about the source of

Current SEC regulations require firms to make supplemental disclosure in Management’s Discussion and Analysis
(MDA) regarding critical accounting estimates if they are material due to their subjectivity and impact on the
financial statements (SEC 2003). However, despite these regulations, investors and regulators continue to assert that
the appropriate level of disclosure is not being made (PCAOB 2011b). At present, auditors are not generally
required to provide assurance regarding their clients’ MDA and, accordingly, do not opine on the adequacy of the
critical accounting estimates disclosure contained in MDA. Instead, they are merely required in the current model to
2
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company information being the auditor as well as cost and administrative burdens (PCAOB
2011b). Investors, however, expressed significant support for the concept of an ADA.
Garnering somewhat more of a consensus, the proposal to expand and mandate the use of EOM
paragraphs was the option that received the greatest support on both sides of the debate (PCAOB
2011b, 2012).
In August 2013, the PCAOB released a proposed auditing standard dealing with the
auditor’s reporting model, adopting an approach similar to the EOM paragraph approach.
Specifically, the proposed standard would require auditors to include in their audit report a
section dealing with “Critical Audit Matters”. Pursuant to the proposed standard, CAMs consist
of matters which “involved the most difficult, subjective, or complex auditor judgments or posed
the most difficulty to the auditor in obtaining sufficient appropriate audit evidence or forming an
opinion on the financial statements” (PCAOB 2013, 6). The auditor is required to disclose
certain information about each CAM in the audit report or to state that there were no CAMs. For
each CAM, the auditor must (i) "identify the critical audit matter”; (ii), “describe the
considerations that led the auditor to determine that the matter is a critical audit matter”; and (iii)
“refer to the relevant financial statement accounts and disclosures that relate to the critical audit
matter, when applicable” (PCAOB 2013, 16).
The previous debate concerning the EOM paragraph option to the expansion of the audit
report is relevant to the proposed standard requirement for the auditor’s reporting on CAMs,
which is very similar in concept. In the debate, auditors generally took the position that any

read the client’s MDA and resolve any inconsistencies between the MDA and the audited financial statements
(PCAOB 2003).
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EOM paragraph should be limited to objective factual information for which auditors are not the
original source and make reference to where the issue is discussed by management (PCAOB
2011b) . They further argued that merely identifying an uncertain issue in the audit report would
likely lead to disclosures by management that were among the most complete in the financial
statements (PCAOB 2011b). Other stakeholders (e.g., investors) in the debate took the position
that such a limited EOM paragraph provided little or no benefit and amounted to “roadmapping”
for financial reporting (PCAOB 2011b). They called for greater information content in EOM
paragraphs such as discussion of why the auditor felt it was important to emphasize the matter
and what uncertainties applied to the area (PCAOB 2011b). This study seeks to inform the
debate by examining what impact reporting on CAMs might have on management disclosure
choice when the level of detail in the auditor discussion of the CAM in the audit report is either
basic (i.e., roadmapping) or more extensive in nature compared to a control condition where the
critical accounting estimate is not treated as a CAM.
Several concurrent studies explore the effect of the proposed auditing standard on various
stakeholders in the financial reporting process. The area most commonly researched has been
the effect of auditor CAM reporting on assessments of auditor legal liability for misstatements in
the client’s financial statements. Several of these studies in a variety of specific contexts have
found that auditor reporting of a CAM may lead to a reduced level of legal liability for auditors
(Kachelmeier et al. 2014 WP; Brasel et al. 2014 WP; Brown et al. 2014 WP). In other specific
contexts, auditor reporting of a CAM was found to lead to higher auditor liability assessments
(Gimbar et al. 2014 WP). Another area being studied is the impact of auditor CAM reporting on
investor decisions. Christensen et al. (2014) find that reporting of a CAM concerning fair value
decreased the likelihood that non-professional investors would invest in the target firm. Sirois et
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al. (2014) found that discussion of a “key audit matter” in the audit report led to greater
“information search” about the matter by their graduate student proxies for non-professional
investors. Interestingly, they also found that participants indicated “lower perceived audit
quality” in the areas of the audit corresponding with the key audit matter (Sirois et al. 2014 WP).
The relevance of all of these studies to my study lies in the many different factors that bear on
the auditor’s decision whether or not to report an audit issue as a CAM, suggesting that there
might be significant variance in that decision.
To my knowledge, there is no concurrent study that specifically addresses the effect of
the proposed standard on management financial disclosure decisions. However, there is one
study that addresses the “communication openness” of non-financial management toward
auditors in the presence of a CAM reporting requirement (Cade and Hodge 2014 WP). In an
abstract setting where non-financial management has private information that the auditor is not
aware of concerning key accounting estimates, Cade and Hodge (2014 WP) find that nonfinancial managers are less likely to openly communicate with their auditors when the auditor is
required to report on the client’s “key accounting estimates” than when they are not. The Cade
and Hodge (2014 WP) study is a valuable complement to this study in the sense that it addresses
an important precursor to the auditor’s CAM reporting decision – the ability of the auditor to
obtain all the relevant knowledge of the issue needed to make an informed decision with regard
to CAM reporting.
2.3 Audit Committee’s Role in Financial Reporting
Audit Committees provide a critical oversight role over corporate financial reporting
(Agoglia et al. 2011; Blue Ribbon Committee 1999; Beasley et al. 2009) which has only
increased subsequent to the passage of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). SOX included a
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number of provisions designed to strengthen audit committees and expand their oversight
responsibilities (U.S. House of Representatives 2002). For example, SOX requires that all audit
committee members be independent and that companies disclose “whether or not … the audit
committee of [the] issuer is comprised of at least [one] member who is a financial expert” (U.S.
House of Representatives 2002) as defined by SOX (Agoglia et al. 2011). Prior research has
characterized stronger audit committees as being more independent, having greater financial
expertise, and meeting more frequently (Bédard et al. 2004; Agoglia et al. 2011). These audit
committee characteristics have been found to lead to improvements in financial reporting quality
(see Agoglia et al. 2011 for a review). For instance, Agoglia et al. (2011) found experimental
evidence that stronger audit committees constrain management exploitation of “bright-line”
rules-based accounting standards for “opportunistic reporting”. Abbott et al. (2004) found that
audit committees that were more independent and met more frequently were less likely to be
associated with accounting restatements (Agoglia et al. 2011). In addition, Bédard et al. (2004)
provide evidence that stronger audit committee independence and expertise reduce the likelihood
of earnings management (Agoglia et al. 2011).
Prior research on audit committee oversight has also identified cross-sectional variance in
the nature of audit committees’ approach to their oversight responsibilities. For example, two
different survey studies (Beasley et al. 2009; Cohen et al. 2010) addressed the audit committee
process and explored how audit committees executed their oversight responsibilities. Beasley et
al. (2009) surveyed 42 audit committee members and found evidence that some audit committee
members felt that oversight of the financial reporting process by the audit committee was
somewhat “ceremonial” while others felt that the audit committee was deeply involved. Cohen
et al. (2010) surveyed 30 audit partners and managers about their perceptions of audit committee
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oversight. In their survey, only 52% of the respondents indicated that the audit committee
impacted the “resolution of contentious” accounting and reporting matters between management
and auditors.
The relationship between audit committee oversight strength and financial reporting
quality can be explained by management’s accountability to the audit committee. The
psychology literature identifies accountability as an effective motivator of human behavior.
According to Kang (2014 WP) under accountability theory (Tetlock et al. 1989), people adopt
“social and cognitive strategies … to obtain acceptance from, or avoid conflict with” parties to
whom they are accountable (Kang et al. 2014 WP; Tetlock et al. 1989). In the context of
financial reporting, managers are accountable to many different parties, including investors,
regulators, their own bosses, and audit committees (Cohen et al. 2004; U.S. House of
Representatives 2002). Audit committees consist of a subset of the firm’s board of directors,
who oversee the firm’s management and have the authority to terminate management.
Accordingly, audit committees represent a high stakes source of accountability to management.
In the course of the debate over the proposed standard, many audit committee members
voiced concerns that expanding the auditor’s reporting model might have the effect of usurping
the audit committee’s responsibility for investor protection (PCAOB 2011b). I seek to inform
the debate by investigating whether management’s accountability to the audit committee actually
makes the audit committee’s oversight critical to the success of the proposed standard.
2.4 Hypothesis Development
2.4.1 Effect of Auditor Reporting of CAMs on Management Disclosure
Recall that managers face a number of offsetting incentives when deciding what level of
financial disclosure to provide. On one hand, managers are encouraged to disclose by concerns

13

over their reputation (Stocken 2000; Beyer et al. 2010), litigation risk (Skinner 1997; Field et al.
2005; Beyer et al. 2010) and the firm’s cost of capital (Beyer et al. 2010). On the other hand,
managers are discouraged from disclosure to avoid proprietary costs (Fischer and Verrecchia
2004; Arya et al. 2009; Beyer et al. 2010) and to maximize their own compensation under stockprice-sensitive compensation plans (Beyer et al. 2010). In addition, management disclosure
choice is sensitive to how informed managers believe investors are about whether management
possesses private information about the firm’s risks and prospects (Beyer et al. 2010). If
investors are thought to know less (more) about management’s possession of private
information, management would be expected to provide less (more) voluntary disclosure of bad
news (Dye 1985; Jung and Kwon 1988; Penno 1997; Pae 2002; Beyer et al. 2010).
An auditor’s decision to report a matter as a CAM effectively shines a spotlight on the
issue. As a result, managers are more likely to perceive a higher level of investor attention to
and knowledge about the issue. Management would thus be more likely to increase the level of
disclosure for the subject of the CAM due to a shift in its incentives. Management would derive
less benefit from lack of disclosure because they would expect investors to “fill in the blanks.”3
In addition, if the matter was spotlighted by the auditor, management’s concern would shift to its
reputation and litigation risk, both of which call for increased disclosure. Furthermore, if the
auditor’s reporting on the CAM was more expansive and included a detailed discussion of why
the auditor was emphasizing the matter, the perceived level of investor knowledge would be
even higher and should lead to even greater level of disclosure provided by management. Based

3

Prior accounting research (Hammersley 2006) has found that experts in a domain (e.g., industry expert auditors)
are adept at elaborating full “cognitive representations” of a problem from partial information sets. In the context of
this study, expert financial users such as industry analysts could be expected to assimilate information in an
auditor’s CAM reporting, even if it is incomplete, to identify areas of undisclosed risk in the financial statements.
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on the foregoing discussion, primarily of economic incentives to disclose, I propose the
following hypothesis:
H1: As the auditor increases the level of detailed reporting given a critical audit
matter in its audit report, the manager will increase the level of disclosure made
about the matter.
2.4.2 Moderating Effect of Audit Committee Oversight Strength
As previously discussed, management is accountable to the audit committee for its
reporting choices. As part of their duties, audit committees communicate with both management
and auditors and review the company’s financial statements, disclosures and audit report in order
to perform their financial reporting oversight (Beasley et al. 2009). Since management has
incentives to avoid disclosure, one purpose for the audit committee’s oversight of financial
reporting is to constrain management’s opportunistic disclosure decisions (Agoglia et al. 2011). I
contend that such audit committee constraint on management opportunism is inconsistent with
the preferences of management. To the extent that an auditor’s reporting of a critical accounting
estimate as a CAM increases the scrutiny of management’s disclosure decision by the audit
committee, the auditor’s reporting on the CAM is also inconsistent with management’s
preference.
Prior research streams in psychology and accounting identify the concept of “motivated
sensitivity” (Ditto et al. 1998; Hales et al. 2011; Hales 2007) and its impact on the processing of
“preference-inconsistent information” (Ditto et al. 1998). In motivated sensitivity, people are
expected to asymmetrically process information that is preference-consistent versus preferenceinconsistent.4 As with motivated reasoning, information that is preference-consistent is expected

4

The psychology and accounting research streams have each developed a stream of literature on the effect of
“motivated reasoning” (Kunda 1990; Kadous et al. 2003; Hales 2007; Hales et al. 2011). Generally, motivated
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to be shallowly processed and readily accepted. However, in motivated sensitivity, preferenceinconsistent information is expected to be processed more deeply and have a greater influence on
the final judgment (Ditto et al. 1998). Preference-inconsistent information is likely to signal
some type of potential harm and so it is in the best interest of the individual to consider the
information deeply (Ditto et al. 1998). One example given in the motivated sensitivity literature
relates to unfavorable health information. People receiving unfavorable health information (i.e.,
preference-inconsistent information) are found to process it more deeply than preferenceconsistent information (Ditto et al. 1998).
In the context of this study, an auditor’s reporting of a critical accounting estimate as a
CAM is inconsistent with management’s preference because it likely increases the audit
committee’s scrutiny given to management’s disclosure decision. Furthermore, ceteris paribus,
the strength of the audit committee should impact the sensitivity of the manager to the
information conveyed by the CAM reporting due to the differing level of accountability
perceived by the manager to the audit committee. Accordingly, managers facing stronger audit
committee oversight should be expected to process more deeply and be more influenced in their
disclosure decision by the content of reporting on the CAM than managers facing only moderate
audit committee oversight.
Prior accounting research on accountability identifies various strategies accountable
parties employ to avoid conflict with parties to whom they are accountable (Gibbins and Newton

reasoning refers to the way in which people search for and process information relevant to a decision when the
decision maker has a preference as to the final decision. People are thought to vigorously pursue and readily accept
information that is consistent with their preference and attempt to discredit and reject information that is preferenceinconsistent. These behaviors are subject to a constraint that the decision maker desires an appearance of objectivity
in their decision making (Kunda 1990; Kadous et al. 2003).
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1994; Peecher et al. 2013; Kang 2014 WP). For example, accountable parties may “shift their
attitude toward” the attitudes of their evaluators, may become defensive and try to justify their
contrary attitudes, or may “expend cognitive effort” to devise a strategy to avoid conflict with the
evaluator (Gibbins and Newton 1994; Peecher et al. 2013). One determining factor for which
strategy is used is whether the attitudes of the evaluator are known. When such attitudes are
known, Gibbins and Newton (1994) identify “attitude shift” as a potentially effective strategy.
Managers confronted with strong audit committee oversight are very likely to perceive that high
quality financial reporting is a key mandate of the audit committee (Kang 2014 WP).
Accordingly, they are likely to adopt strategies to provide higher quality financial reporting in
order to avoid conflict with the audit committee. Agoglia et al. (2011) find evidence of this for
managers who face strong audit committees. Managers in the study indicated that concern over
“second-guessing” of their accounting decisions by the audit committee was much greater when
the audit committee was strong than when it was weak (Agoglia et al. 2011). These managers
facing stronger audit committees also made more conservative accounting treatment decisions as
a result of that concern.
Recall that H1 predicts that as the spotlight on a critical accounting estimate increases,
managers will increase the level of disclosure made regarding the critical accounting estimate.
Based on the foregoing discussion, I predict that this effect will be moderated by the strength of
audit committee oversight and therefore propose the following hypothesis:
H2: Managers will increase the level of disclosure made regarding a critical
audit matter more in response to increased level of detail given the matter in the
audit report when the audit committee’s oversight is strong than when it is
moderate.
The pattern of results predicted in H1 and H2 is presented in Figure 1.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
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III.

METHOD

3.1 Participants
Given the high degree of professional judgment required for the experimental task in this
study, it was important to ensure that participants had strong task-relevant experience (Trotman
2005). Accordingly, experimental participants are seasoned public company financial
executives, primarily CFOs. CFOs are the most likely to make the key financial disclosure
decisions for their organizations and are therefore best equipped to provide relevant and reliable
ex ante insights into the potential effects of the proposed standard. I identified potential
participants in the Audit Analytics database of officer changes. I collected recent CFO
appointments5 for public companies between 2007 and mid-2014 with positive revenues up to $2
billion.6 Potential participants were invited to participate in the study via a recruitment cover
letter which described the study and its importance. The mailing also included the experimental
materials and a stamped return envelope. I mailed a total of 1,889 packages7, 123 of which were

5

In the vast majority of cases, mailings were only sent to one CFO per company. In five cases, mailings were
inadvertently sent to two different individuals who had been appointed to CFO for the same company at different
times. In addition, in one case, two mailings were sent to one individual who was concurrently CFO of two different
companies. In total, these mailings comprise less than 1% of the population to which mailings were sent.
6
I followed the approach of Bishop et al. (2014) in choosing to recruit participants from companies with positive
revenues up to $2 billion for several reasons. First, the positive revenue requirement was to focus on operational
companies as opposed to shell or other non-operating entities. Next, I reasoned that companies under $2 billion
would be both more likely to respond and have CFOs more likely to be deeply involved in the financial reporting of
their firms.
7
The packages were sent out in a series of four mailings over a four-month period. The first mailing was sent in
equal proportions to the six treatment conditions in the study. In order to achieve adequate sample size in each
treatment condition, subsequent mailings were sent in proportions which emphasized cells which had previously
received fewer responses from participants. To test for differences between mailings, I added MAILING as a
covariate to all ANCOVAs reported in Tables 2-6. In all cases, MAILING was not significant in the analyses (all
p’s > .26, two-tailed).
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returned as undeliverable, for a net total of 1,766. A total of 142 participants completed the
experimental materials, for a response rate of 8.0%.8
Table 1 presents the demographics of participants in the study. The extent and nature of
the participants’ experience is a strong match for the demands of the experimental task.
Participants had a mean work experience of 29.2 years9. A total of 135 (95%) of the participants
indicated their current title was CFO and all participants have had significant responsibility for
their firm’s financial reporting at some point during their career. Approximately 73.9% of the
participants were current or former CPAs, 71.8% had prior experience as an auditor, and 23.9%
were current or former audit committee members. Mean age of the participants was 54.0 and
87.9% (12.1%) of participants were male (female).10,11
[Insert Table 1 here]

8

The response rate of 8% falls within the range of response rates in recent studies involving accounting and finance
professionals including Agoglia et al. 2011 (11.3%); Bennett et al. 2013 WP (5.6%); and Bishop et al. 2014 WP
(20%). To address whether non-response bias had any effect on my primary dependent variable, Extent of
Disclosure, I added an early/late (EARLYLATE) response indicator as a covariate to all ANCOVAs reported in
Tables 2-6. In all cases, EARLYLATE was not significant in the analyses (all p’s > .49, two-tailed).
9
Thirteen of the 142 participants (9.2%) did not give precise years of work experience. Rather, they inserted a”+”
after the given number (e.g., 30+). In the interest of conservatively estimating work experience, I coded these as the
given number (e.g., 30 for “30+”).
10
One participant failed to indicate gender and two participants failed to indicate age. These participants are
excluded from the reported demographic information for age and gender.
11
I tested for systematic differences between experimental cells for all key demographic variables across all
ANCOVAs which I report as primary results (All conditions, No CAM versus Long CAM, Short CAM versus Long
CAM and No CAM versus Short CAM). Only one variable, GENDER, yielded a significant difference between
cells (F5, 135 =1.99, p=.084, two-tailed when All Conditions were analyzed and F3, 92=3.325, p=.023, two-tailed when
only No CAM and Short CAM conditions were analyzed). To determine whether GENDER had any effect on my
primary dependent variable, Extent of Disclosure, I added GENDER as a covariate to all ANCOVAs reported in
Tables 2-6. In all cases, GENDER was not significant in the analyses (all p’s > .22, two-tailed). Accordingly, I did
not include GENDER in the reported ANCOVA results.
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3.2 Design
3.2.1 Independent Variables
I utilized a 2X3 full factorial between subjects design. My first independent variable,
Audit Committee Oversight Strength (hereafter “AC Strength”), was varied at two levels,
moderate and strong. My manipulation of AC Strength focused on the expertise of the audit
committee members (Agoglia et al. 2011) as well a description of the audit committee’s
oversight of the financial reporting function. Prior research has found that while most audit
committees have at least one financial expert as defined by SEC rules, a minority of all audit
committee members have expertise in accounting (Cohen et al. 2014; Badolato et al. 2013 WP).
Thus, in the strong audit committee condition, all three members of the audit committee were
described as accounting experts with direct accounting or financial reporting experience
(Agoglia et al. 2011). In the moderate audit committee condition, only 1 of the three audit
committee members was described as a finance expert and none of the members had direct
accounting or financial reporting expertise (Agoglia et al. 2011).12 Prior research has also
identified significant cross-sectional variance in the intensity of audit committees’ approach to
their oversight responsibilities (Beasley et al. 2009; Cohen et al. 2010). Therefore, in the strong
audit committee condition, the materials described the audit committee as playing an active role
in resolution of challenging accounting and reporting issues including asking many questions
about accounting and reporting issues. In the moderate audit committee condition, the audit
committee was described as playing a limited role in resolution of challenging accounting and

12

The manipulation of audit committee expertise within the AC Strength manipulation is borrowed with permission
directly from Agoglia et al. 2011, for which I am grateful.
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reporting issues and occasionally asking questions about accounting and reporting issues.
Excerpts of the AC Strength manipulations are presented in Appendix A.
My second independent variable, Auditor Reporting Choice, was varied at three levels in
order to investigate whether the amount of detail provided in the auditor’s CAM discussion had
an effect on managers’ disclosure decisions beyond the identification of the issue as a CAM. In
the No CAM (control) condition, participants were told that the auditor had decided not to treat
the critical accounting estimate as a CAM. The Short CAM and Long CAM conditions were
designed to address the concern raised by some stakeholders that if auditors provided only
minimal CAM reporting, the proposed standard would have limited impact (PCAOB 2011b). In
the Short CAM condition, participants were told that the auditor had decided to treat the critical
accounting estimate as a CAM and were provided with the auditor’s brief discussion of the CAM
in the audit report. The discussion was limited to the minimal information necessary to comply
with the proposed standard -- identification of the matter and a brief discussion of why the matter
was selected as a CAM. In the Long CAM condition, participants were told that the auditor had
decided to treat the critical accounting estimate as a CAM and were provided with the auditor’s
detailed discussion of the CAM in the audit report. The Long CAM condition included the
information in the Short CAM condition plus a richer qualitative description of the uncertainties
encompassed in the matter and the potential future implications. 13

13

In order to hold information constant across all conditions, the qualitative information included in the Long CAM
condition was included for all conditions within a discussion of the auditor’s decision.
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3.2.2 Experimental Materials and Task
The experimental materials involved a financial reporting disclosure scenario.14
Participants were asked to assume the role of Chief Financial Officer for a hypothetical public
company named Andarex Corp. which has traditionally manufactured and sold high-end
consumer products. Andarex had been public for 10 years and has a record of consistently
meeting its revenue and earnings growth targets. Background materials also described good
relations between Andarex and its auditors and a history of unqualified opinions on financial
reporting and internal controls. In addition, Andarex’s audit committee was described based on
the varying treatment conditions discussed above.
Participants were informed that Andarex’s auditors will be following a new PCAOB
regulation that requires them to report on critical audit matters to highlight the audit and financial
reporting issues of greatest significance. Participants were then told they would be asked to
consider only one audit issue for which the auditor was considering treatment as a CAM.
Specifically, the participants would review case information about the warranty exposure
Andarex has for a newly launched product.15
In the most recent year, Andarex launched a new product to a completely different, costconscious consumer segment. As a result, Andarex management was confronted with the
difficult task of estimating its warranty exposure for the new product given its different warranty

14

As part of instrument development, I met with three current or former chief financial officers to review all aspects
of the case materials and post-experimental questionnaire. In each meeting, I had the professional read the
instrument from beginning to end stopping between sections to discuss comprehensibility and realism of the
materials, language used and questions. Prior to finalizing the instrument, I made revisions based on feedback
received from the professionals to ensure the maximum comprehensibility and realism of the instrument.
15
In the interest of accommodating professionals from a broad range of industries, I selected a warranty task as it is
a fundamental accounting task that is widely understood by professionals with accounting experience and education
(Perreault and Kida 2011).
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terms and customer base for the product. The case described a significant element of uncertainty
in the estimate related to what percentage of customers would likely file a claim in the event of a
defective product. Participants received a detailed warranty calculation setting forth various
assumptions including the one with significant uncertainty. The warranty estimate ranged from a
minimum of $520,000 before taxes to a maximum of $1.56 million, the difference of which is
material to Andarex’s earnings. Andarex decided to record the minimum amount of the range in
the current year until such time as it has more history with regard to the assumptions in the
estimate.
After reviewing the case materials including a detailed discussion of the warranty
estimate as well as the auditor’s decision whether or not to treat the warranty issue as a CAM,
participants rated the extent of disclosure they would choose to make about the warranty estimate
as well as the likelihood that they would disclose different elements of information related to the
warranty issue in Andarex’s financial reporting.
3.2.3 Dependent Variables
I collected one primary dependent variable and six secondary dependent variables from
participants in the study. First, the primary dependent variable was a measurement of the extent
of disclosure (Extent of Disclosure) that the participant would choose to provide for the warranty
estimate rated on a 10-point Likert scale where 1 = minimal disclosure and 10 = extensive
disclosure. I interpret increases in Extent of Disclosure as increases in the amount of information
participants intend to communicate to the financial statement user through their disclosure. In
this context, I contend that increases in Extent of Disclosure correspond with increases in
disclosure quality as users have more information with which to assess the risks and prospects of
the firm. I treat Extent of Disclosure as my primary dependent variable as it is important to
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obtain an overall measure of participants’ intention with regard to how much information will be
disclosed before delving into the specifics of what elements of disclosure managers may choose
to enrich the overall disclosure.
Participants were next asked to consider six individual disclosure elements that could be
included in the disclosure of Andarex’s warranty exposure issue. I collect these ratings in order
to perform further analysis of the different elements of information that managers might be more
likely to include as Extent of Disclosure increases. Each disclosure element was rated on a 10point Likert scale where 1 = Definitely Not Disclose and 10 = Definitely Disclose.16 Each rating
addressed a different element of disclosure. Certain of the disclosure elements represent
quantitative information that could enhance the financial statement user’s ability to quantify the
risk in a critical accounting estimate. These elements include (i) the range of the warranty
estimate (RANGE); a description of the key uncertain assumption in the estimate (KEY
ASSUMPTION); and (iii) a sensitivity analysis of the warranty estimate based on movement in
the key uncertain assumption (SENSITIVITY). While disclosures of this type are generally
required by current SEC regulations, many stakeholders have pointed to a lack of compliance in
this area (PCAOB 2011b). Other disclosure elements collected are more commonplace in
current practice including (i) the amounts reported in the financial statements (FS AMOUNT);
(ii) the rationale for the recorded amount (RATIONALE); and (iii) a description of uncertainty in

16

Since I contend that each of the disclosure elements I measure is necessary for a complete disclosure of the critical
accounting estimate (see note 17), I interpret an increase in the likelihood of management disclosure of each element
as an increase in the quality of the firm’s overall disclosure of the critical accounting estimate.
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the estimate (UNCERTAINTY).17 A concrete example of each disclosure element was provided
before the rating was elicited. The disclosure element examples are included in Appendix C.
3.2.4 Procedures
The experimental materials were divided into two packets. Packet 1 included the case
materials and concluded with the disclosure ratings described above. Participants first read an
introduction to the experiment including the role of CFO they assume in the case. Next, the
participants were given information regarding the company, its audit committee (including the
AC Strength manipulation) and the audit currently underway. Participants were then informed of
the auditor’s decision whether or not to report Andarex’s warranty issue as a CAM (the Auditor
Reporting Choice manipulation). Finally, a detailed discussion of the warranty reserve issue was
provided. After reviewing the materials, participants provided their disclosure ratings.
Participants were instructed to read and complete Packet 1 before proceeding to Packet 2. Packet
2 was a post-experimental questionnaire which included manipulation check questions as well as
questions about the experiment, participant judgments and demographic information.
Participants were instructed not to refer to Packet 1 while completing Packet 2. The flow of the
experiment is summarized in Figure 2.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
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Taken together, I contend that disclosure of all these elements would result in a rich disclosure of the critical
accounting estimate more in line with the intentions of the SEC regulations. It is likely that management has
differing sensitivities to disclosure of these elements. For example, management is likely to be highly sensitive to
the disclosure of the range of the warranty estimate, description of the key assumptions in the estimate and
sensitivity analysis of the estimate. Disclosure of the amount of warranty expense and warranty accrual in the
financial statements is commonplace and managers are less likely to be sensitive to disclosure of these elements.
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IV.

RESULTS

4.1 Manipulation Checks
AC Strength was manipulated as either moderate or strong between subjects. To test
whether the manipulation was effective, I collected participant ratings of the audit committee’s
strength on two dimensions, accounting/financial expertise (Agoglia et al. 2011) and audit
committee involvement in financial reporting decisions. Participants rated audit committee
oversight strength on a 7-point Likert scale where 1 = Low and 7 = High (Agoglia et al. 2011).18
Participants in the Strong AC Strength condition rated the audit committee’s accounting/financial
expertise as significantly stronger than participants in the Moderate AC Strength condition (6.07
versus 2.91, t139=15.61, p<.001, two-tailed). Participants in the Strong AC condition also rated
the audit committee’s involvement in financial reporting issues as significantly stronger than
participants in the Moderate AC Strength condition (5.83 versus 3.12, t138=11.21, p<.001, twotailed). These ratings provide evidence of an effective manipulation of AC Strength in the
experiment.
To test the effectiveness of my Auditor Reporting Choice manipulation, I performed two
tests. First, all participants were asked to recall whether the auditor in the case decided to report
Andarex’s warranty issue as a CAM. Of the 142 participants, 137 (96.5%) correctly recalled the
auditor’s choice regarding the CAM.19 Next, I specifically tested the effectiveness of the
manipulation of Auditor Reporting Choice between the short CAM and Long CAM conditions
by comparing how participants rated the informativeness of the CAM discussion provided by the

18

Two of the 142 participants failed to provide one or both of the AC Strength ratings and are excluded from the
manipulation check tests.
19
Of the 5 remaining participants, four answered the question incorrectly and one failed to answer the question.
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auditor in the audit report. Participants in the No CAM condition are excluded from this test as
no CAM discussion was provided by the auditor on which to measure informativeness.
Participants rated how informative the auditor’s CAM reporting was on a 7-point Likert scale
where 1 = Not at all Informative and 7 = Very Informative.20 Participants in the Long CAM
condition rated the auditor’s CAM reporting as significantly more informative than in the Short
CAM condition (4.67 versus 3.89, t90=2.73, p<.01, two-tailed). Collectively, these results
provide evidence of an effective manipulation of Auditor Reporting Choice.
4.2 Hypothesis Tests
Hypothesis 1 predicts that as the auditor increases the spotlight on a critical accounting
estimate through the level of detailed reporting given the matter in its audit report, managers will
increase the level of disclosure made regarding the matter. As reported in table 2, the pattern of
results followed this prediction. Participants rated the Extent of Disclosure they would provide
about the warranty exposure issue lowest in the No CAM control condition ( x =6.72) and Extent
of Disclosure increased as the auditor provided greater detail in the Short CAM ( x =7.08) and
Long CAM ( x =7.42) conditions, respectively. To test hypothesis 1, I conducted an ANCOVA
analysis of the effect of Auditor Reporting Choice and AC Strength on the primary dependent
variable, Extent of Disclosure.21 Results of the ANCOVA reported in table 2 show a marginal
effect of Auditor Reporting Choice on Extent of Disclosure (F2, 134 =1.889, p=.078, one-tailed)

20

Of the 95 participants in the Short CAM and Long CAM conditions, 3 failed to answer the question and are
excluded from the manipulation check tests.
21
I include a covariate in the analysis for the effect of the participants’ concern that disclosure would reveal
proprietary information about the company (Proprietary) as prior research has identified this as a significant factor
in management’s disclosure decision (Fischer and Verrecchia 2004; Arya et al. 2009; Beyer et al. 2010). As
expected, the covariate for Proprietary has a significant effect on Extent of Disclosure (F2, 134=12.42, p<.001, onetailed). Results of an ANOVA excluding the Proprietary covariate were qualitatively similar. While the
significance of the main effects of Auditor Reporting Choice and AC Strength were somewhat weaker, the
interaction of Auditor Reporting Choice and AC Strength remained significant at p<.01.
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providing marginal support for Hypothesis 1 indicating that managers respond to the auditor
providing greater detail about a critical accounting estimate in its report by increasing their own
disclosure of the matter.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the strength of the audit committee’s oversight will moderate
the effect of the auditor’s CAM reporting choice on the Extent of Disclosure about the warranty
estimate issue provided by the manager. Specifically, H2 predicts that the effect of the auditor’s
CAM reporting choice on Extent of Disclosure will be greatest when audit committee oversight
is strongest. The results reported in Table 222 and Figure 3 provide support for this prediction.
When audit committee oversight is strong, the Extent of Disclosure provided by the manager is
greatest in the Long CAM condition ( x =8.08) compared to the No CAM condition ( x =6.95)
and the Short CAM discussion ( x =6.79). When audit committee oversight strength is only
moderate, the Extent of Disclosure provided by the manager is no greater in the Long CAM
condition ( x =6.53) than in the No CAM condition ( x =6.52) and is actually lower than in the
Short CAM discussion ( x =7.36).23 As reported in Table 2, the interaction of Auditor Reporting
Choice and AC Strength is significant (F2, 134=5.448, p=.003, one-tailed).24 Simple effects
analysis reveals that when audit committee oversight is strong, Extent of Disclosure is higher in
the Long CAM condition than in the No CAM condition (F1, 45=8.195, p=.006) and the Short

22

One of the 142 participants did not provide an Extent of Disclosure rating, the primary dependent variable. This
participant is excluded from all results for Extent of Disclosure.
23
See Supplemental Analysis – Comparison of CAM conditions for a discussion of this unexpected result.
24
To provide further evidence of the predicted interaction, I conducted a planned contrast of the effect of Auditor
Reporting Choice and AC Strength on Extent of Disclosure as it is a more powerful test of a predicted ordinal
interaction (Buckless and Ravenscroft 1990). Contrast coefficients were +5 for Strong AC/Long CAM, +2 for
Strong AC/ Short CAM, -1 for Strong AC/No CAM, -1 for Moderate AC/Long CAM, -2 for Moderate AC/ Short
CAM, and -3 for Moderate AC/No CAM. As expected, results of the planned contrast reported in Table 2, Panel C
were significant (t135=2.69, p=.004, one-tailed).
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CAM condition (F1, 47=7.143, p=.010). However, when audit committee oversight is only
moderate, Extent of Disclosure is no different in the Long CAM condition than in the No CAM
condition (F1, 41=.013, p=.910) and is actually lower than in the Short CAM condition (F1,
41=4.925,

p=.032). Collectively, these results indicate that the audit committee’s oversight will

play an important role in determining the impact of auditors’ increased reporting of CAMs on
managers’ disclosure choices with stronger audit committee oversight leading to greater
increases in disclosure when auditors increase the level of detail given a CAM in their audit
reports.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
4.3 Supplemental Analysis
4.3.1 Comparisons of CAM conditions
In order to gain further insight into the results, I performed a series of supplemental
comparisons to determine specific effects of the various levels of CAM reporting choices. I first
compared the No CAM control condition and Long CAM condition. This is the starkest
comparison which allows me to investigate the maximum effect of a Long CAM discussion by
the auditor on management’s disclosure decisions. The pattern of results for this comparison are
presented in Figure 4. When audit committee oversight is strong, the Extent of Disclosure
provided by the manager is significantly greater (F1, 45=8.195, p=.006) in the Long CAM
condition ( x =8.08) than in the No CAM condition ( x =6.95). When audit committee oversight
strength is only moderate, the Extent of Disclosure provided by the manager is no greater (F1,
41=.013,

p=.910) in the Long CAM condition ( x =6.53) than in the No CAM condition ( x

=6.52). As reported in Table 3, the results were consistent with the full results reported above.
As expected, the ANCOVA results reveal a significant effect of Auditor Reporting Choice on
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Extent of Disclosure (F1, 87=3.579, p=.031, one-tailed). In addition, the interaction of Auditor
Reporting Choice and AC Strength is significant (F1, 87=2.800, p=.049, one-tailed).25 These
results provide evidence that inclusion of a detailed CAM discussion regarding a critical
accounting estimate in the audit report leads to greater disclosure by managers than when the
estimate is not treated as a CAM by the auditor and this effect is strongest when audit committee
oversight is strong.
[Insert Table 3 and Figure 4 here]
Next, I compared the Short CAM and long CAM conditions to investigate whether the
level of detail in the discussion provided for the CAM affects the manager’s Extent of Disclosure
decision. As can be seen in Figure 5, when audit committee oversight is strong, the Extent of
Disclosure provided by the manager is significantly greater (F1, 47=7.143, p=.010) in the Long
CAM condition ( x =8.08) than in the Short CAM condition ( x =6.79). When audit committee
oversight strength is only moderate, the Extent of Disclosure provided by the manager in the
Long CAM condition ( x =6.53) is actually significantly lower (F1, 41=4.925, p=.032) than in the
Short CAM condition ( x =7.36).26 Results of the ANCOVA are presented in Table 4. While the
main effect of Auditor Reporting Choice is not significant (F1, 89=.131, p=.359, one-tailed), the
interaction of Auditor Reporting Choice and AC Strength is significant (F1, 89=9.921, p=.001,

25

To provide further evidence of the predicted interaction, I conducted a planned contrast of the effect of Auditor
Reporting Choice and AC Strength on Extent of Disclosure. Contrast coefficients were +5 for Strong AC/Long
CAM, -1 for Strong AC/No CAM, -1 for Moderate AC/Long CAM, and -3 for Moderate AC/No CAM. As
expected, results of the planned contrast reported in Table 3, Panel C were significant (t88=3.51, p=.001, one-tailed).
26
This result should be interpreted with caution as it may be an anomaly. Recall that along with this Extent of
Disclosure rating, I also collected individual ratings for six disclosure elements. Comparison between the Short
CAM and Long CAM conditions for these disclosure element ratings as well as the mean of all disclosure element
ratings is presented in Table 8. The decrease in Extent of Disclosure between the Short CAM and Long CAM
conditions when audit committee oversight is only moderate is not seen in the likelihood to disclose ratings for any
of the disclosure elements or the mean of all ratings. So, it would seem that while participants in the Short CAM/
Moderate AC condition favored a higher Extent of Disclosure than participants in the Long CAM/Moderate AC
condition, this did not translate to them being more likely to disclose any of the individual elements.
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one-tailed).27 Collectively, these results suggest that the level of detail provided in the auditor’s
CAM discussion is an important determinant of the manager’s disclosure choice regarding the
matter and that greater detail in the auditor’s CAM discussion is likely to lead to greater
disclosure by management.
[Insert Table 4 and Figure 5 here]
Finally, I compared the No CAM control condition and the Short CAM condition to
determine whether the auditor merely identifying the warranty estimate issue as a CAM and
providing a brief discussion in the audit report would impact manager disclosure decisions. As
can be seen in Figure 6, when audit committee oversight is strong, the Extent of Disclosure
provided by the manager is no different (F1, 43=.030, p=.864) in the Short CAM condition ( x
=6.79) from the No CAM condition ( x =6.95). When audit committee oversight strength is only
moderate, the Extent of Disclosure provided by the manager in the Short CAM condition ( x
=7.36) is significantly greater (F1, 47=6.952, p=.011) than in the No CAM condition ( x =6.52).28
As reported in table 5, Auditor Reporting Choice is not significant (F1, 91=2.404, p=.124, twotailed).29 The interaction of Auditor Reporting Choice and AC Strength was marginally
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To provide further evidence of the predicted interaction, I conducted a planned contrast of the effect of Auditor
Reporting Choice and AC Strength on Extent of Disclosure. Contrast coefficients were +4 for Strong AC/Long
CAM, +1 for Strong AC/Short CAM, -2 for Moderate AC/Long CAM, and -3 for Moderate AC/Short CAM. As
expected, results of the planned contrast reported in Table 4, Panel C were significant (t 90=2.07, p=.021, one-tailed).
28
Once again, this result should be interpreted with caution as it may be an anomaly related to the same participant
ratings of Extent of Disclosure for the Short CAM/Moderate AC condition discussed in footnote 27. As before, I
compared the individual disclosure element ratings as well as the mean of all disclosure element ratings between the
Short CAM and No CAM conditions presented in Table 9. The increase in Extent of Disclosure between the No
CAM and Short CAM conditions when audit committee oversight is only moderate is not seen in the likelihood to
disclose ratings for any of the disclosure elements or the mean of all ratings. So, it would seem that while
participants in the Short CAM/ Moderate AC condition favored a higher Extent of Disclosure than participants in the
No CAM/Moderate AC condition, this did not translate to them being more likely to disclose any of the individual
elements.
29
I used two-tailed tests for this ANCOVA because the pattern of results was inconsistent with theory.
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significant (F1, 91=2.862, p=.094, two-tailed) but not in the pattern predicted by theory.30
Collectively, these results suggest that if the auditor only provides minimal detail in its CAM
reporting, disclosure by the manager might not be affected.
[Insert Table 5 and Figure 6 here]
4.3.2 Disclosure Element Ratings
Management has to make a wide variety of decisions regarding what they feel is
important to disclose. Recall that I identified six disclosure elements that collectively would
make up a comprehensive disclosure of the critical accounting estimate. To develop further
insight on management disclosure choices, I analyzed participant ratings of the likelihood that
they would choose to disclose each item. Results of the disclosure element ratings are reported
in Tables 6 through 9. For each disclosure element in each comparison (all conditions, No CAM
vs Long CAM, Short CAM vs Long CAM, and No CAM vs Short CAM), I conducted planned
contrasts with weightings identical to the planned contrasts for Extent of Disclosure described in
the primary analysis. In other words, I am testing whether participants increase the likelihood
that they would disclose the element in response to an increase in the level of the auditor’s CAM
reporting and whether that increase in likelihood to disclose is greater in the presence of stronger
audit committee oversight.
Several elements of disclosure stand out in the analysis. Most notable are three elements
of disclosure, each of which provide quantitative information that would enhance the financial
statement user’s ability to quantify the risk in the warranty estimate. Specifically, participants’

30

As an additional test of the predicted interaction, I conducted a planned contrast of the effect of Auditor Reporting
Choice and AC Strength on Extent of Disclosure. Contrast coefficients were +4 for Strong AC/Short CAM, +1 for
Strong AC/No CAM, -2 for Moderate AC/Short CAM, and -3 for Moderate AC/No CAM. Results of the planned
contrast reported in Table 5, Panel C were not significant (t92=-.082, p=.935, two-tailed).
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ratings of the likelihood that they would disclose the RANGE of the warranty estimate, the KEY
ASSUMPTION used in the estimate, and a SENSITIVITY analysis of the warranty estimate each
followed the general pattern of results predicted.31
In the comparison of all six treatment conditions reported in Table 6, the planned contrast
was marginally significant for RANGE (t136=1.404, p=.082, one-tailed). In addition, the planned
contrasts for KEY ASSUMPTION and SENSITIVITY were significant (all p’s<.05, one-tailed). In
the comparison of the No CAM and Long CAM conditions reported in Table 7, RANGE, KEY
ASSUMPTION, and SENSITIVITY were all significant (all p’s<.053, one-tailed). In the
comparison of the Short CAM and Long CAM conditions reported in Table 8, KEY
ASSUMPTION and SENSITIVITY were significant (all p’s<.05, one-tailed). In all of these
results, the disclosure element was rated as most likely to be disclosed in the Long CAM/Strong
AC condition. This finding is of particular importance as these quantitative disclosure elements
are the type of information frequently cited as lacking in management disclosure (PCAOB
2011b) and is consistent with participants increasing the Extent of Disclosure as discussed in the
primary results.
In the comparison of the No CAM and Short CAM conditions reported in Table 9, none
of the planned contrasts for RANGE, KEY ASSUMPTION, or SENSITIVITY disclosure elements
were found to be significant (all p’s >.62, two-tailed.). A closer review of the results reveals that
there is no discernible pattern wherein minimal auditor CAM reporting leads to greater manager
disclosure than if the auditor chooses not to report the matter as a CAM, regardless of the audit

This is particularly noteworthy in light of the fact that even in the Long CAM condition, the auditor’s discussion
did not include any specific quantitative information regarding the warranty estimate. This was an intentional
design choice to avoid the manager’s decision to disclose being a foregone conclusion if the auditor provided such
information in their own CAM discussion of the warranty estimate.
31
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committee oversight strength. Importantly, this finding provides support for investor and
regulator concerns that minimal CAM reporting will not lead to meaningful improvement in
manager disclosure.
In all of the comparisons, Elements of disclosure that do not reveal quantitative risk in the
warranty estimate do not follow the pattern of results predicted in Hypothesis 2. Specifically,
participant ratings of the likelihood that they would disclose (i) the FS AMOUNT of the warranty
estimate actually recorded in the financial statements; and (ii) a qualitative description of
UNCERTAINTY in the estimate each did not conform to the predicted pattern of results (all p’s
> .29, one-tailed except the comparison of No CAM and Short CAM which is two-tailed). This
finding is not unexpected because disclosure of this type of information is already commonplace.
There was also no significant result for RATIONALE, which might be due to the fact that it did
not communicate much in the way of incremental information beyond information in the other
disclosure elements.
[Insert Tables 6 through 9 here]
4.4 Discussion
The primary and supplemental analyses provide a number of important insights into the
effect of the proposed standard on management disclosure decisions. First, the results generally
support my prediction that managers will react to the auditor shining a spotlight on a highly
uncertain critical accounting estimate by increasing their own disclosure of the matter. Second,
audit committee oversight is likely to play an important role in determining the impact of
auditors’ increased reporting of CAMs on managers’ disclosure choices. Managers facing strong
audit committee oversight are likely to increase the extent of their disclosure more than when the
audit committee oversight is only moderate. Third, the level of detail provided by the auditor in
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its CAM reporting plays an important role in determining the extent of disclosure the manager
chooses to make. When the auditor provides a minimal discussion of the CAM, management
does not appear likely to respond with increased disclosure. However, when the auditor’s CAM
discussion is detailed, management is likely to respond with increased disclosure of its own.
Finally, when the auditor provides a detailed CAM discussion, it appears that managers are likely
to increase disclosure of quantitative information that would enhance the financial statement
user’s ability to quantify the risk in a critical accounting estimate. This is particularly
encouraging as this was one of the central goals of the PCAOB auditor’s reporting model project.
V. CONCLUSION
This study investigates whether the current changes proposed by the PCAOB to the
auditor’s reporting model are likely to spur management to provide enhanced disclosure that
investors are demanding about areas of uncertainty in the financial statements. According to
Martin Baumann, Chief Auditor of the PCAOB, the proposed standard is among initiatives that
“would make very significant changes to the auditor's report for the first time in some 75 years”
(PCAOB 2014). Thus, it is important to all stakeholders in the financial reporting process to
develop an ex ante understanding of how proposed changes might affect financial reporting and
disclosure quality (Maines 1994; Beresford 1997).
To study the effects of the proposed standard, I conducted an experiment involving
highly experienced public company financial executives, primarily chief financial officers. The
extensive experience of the participant group was critical given the importance of obtaining
reliable insights on the proposal. Participants rated the extent of disclosure they would be likely
to give for a highly uncertain critical accounting estimate. In addition, they rated the likelihood
that they would disclose a variety of disclosure elements related to the critical accounting
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estimate. The experiment varied how the auditor decided to treat the critical accounting estimate
in their audit report as well as the strength of the audit committee’s oversight over financial
reporting.
Results of the experiment provide a number of important insights into the potential effect
of the proposed change to the auditor’s reporting model. I find that managers will react to
detailed auditor reporting of a CAM by increasing their own disclosure of the matter including
quantitative information which could enhance the financial statement user’s ability to quantify
the risk in a critical accounting estimate. In addition, I find that the level of detail provided by
the auditor in its CAM reporting plays an important role in determining the extent of disclosure
the manager chooses to make. Finally, despite concerns about the diminished role of the audit
committee should the proposed standard be adopted, I find that the audit committee is likely to
continue to be a key source of accountability playing a pivotal role in the effectiveness of the
auditor’s reporting model changes.
There are limitations to the study which represent opportunities for future research. In
order to gain initial insights on the effect of the proposed standard on manager disclosure
decisions, my experimental setting was an intentionally simple one in which the auditor makes
an independent decision whether or not to report a CAM and what level of detail to provide.
Furthermore, my design intentionally avoided the prospect of the auditor discussing specific
quantitative information about the critical accounting estimate in its CAM reporting in order to
allow managers to make unconstrained decisions whether or not to disclose the information
themselves. In reality, the process is likely to follow a more iterative structure akin to the
auditor-client negotiation process of resolving audit adjustments (Gibbins et al. 2001, Sanchez et
al. 2007). On one hand, auditors are likely to signal their preferences for disclosure to clients in
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the hopes that disclosure will meet their preferences. On the other hand, clients are likely to seek
compromise with auditors on the minimum level of disclosure the auditor will accept without
needing to disclose original information about the company in its CAM reporting. This auditorclient interaction represents a fruitful area for future research.
The study has important implications for the various stakeholders to the PCAOB project
on the auditor’s reporting model as well as academic research. First, in order to pursue their
objective of providing greater information to the markets, it is critical for regulators to continue
to emphasize the importance of auditors providing more than cursory discussion of CAMs in
their audit report. The study confirms fears raised by many that minimal discussion of CAMs by
auditors in their report is unlikely to lead managers to provide disclosure about uncertainty in the
financial statements that investors are demanding. Next, the quality of audit committee oversight
is likely to have an effect on how managers react to enhancements of the auditor report under the
proposed standard. Strong audit committee oversight will be needed for the full benefits of the
proposed standard to be reaped by investors. Finally, the study extends the accounting literature
regarding the effect of regulatory changes on financial reporting quality. Most of the concurrent
studies on the proposed standard focus on financial stakeholders other than management such as
auditors and investors. Many of these studies, as a necessary part of their design, presume that
the manager does not react to enhancements in the audit report. The results of this study suggest
that if proposed regulatory change is implemented correctly and corporate governance is strong,
higher quality financial reporting by management will more likely be forthcoming.
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Appendix A – Audit Committee Description32
All conditions received the following general information regarding the Audit Committee:
Andarex’s audit committee is responsible for overseeing the financial reporting process,
including a review of the company’s financial statements and disclosures. The audit
committee meets about eight times a year and is made up of three members, all of whom
satisfy the independence criteria for audit committee members. In addition:
The following additional information about the audit committee and its oversight constitute the
AC Strength manipulation:
Moderate Audit Committee Oversight condition


Only one of the members qualifies as an “audit committee financial expert,” as
prescribed by the SEC, and is viewed as a supervisory financial expert. That is, this is an
individual with an understanding of financial reporting but no direct accounting or
financial reporting experience. While this individual qualifies as an audit committee
financial expert, none of the members has any direct accounting or financial
reporting experience.



The audit committee is somewhat involved in the resolution of key accounting and
disclosure issues. Audit committee members are reactive; they follow discussions of the
issues during meetings but they do not ask too many questions regarding these issues.

Strong Audit Committee Oversight condition


All of the members qualify as “audit committee financial experts,” as prescribed by
the SEC, and are viewed as accounting financial experts. That is, these are individuals
with an understanding of financial reporting and direct accounting or financial reporting
experience.



The audit committee is actively involved in the resolution of key accounting and
disclosure issues. Audit committee members are proactive; they lead discussion of
issues during meetings, often ask probing questions, and debate the appropriate
accounting treatment regarding key transactions/issues.

32

Significant portions of the Audit Committee Description in my instrument, most importantly the description of the
audit committee’s expertise and part of the introduction, are borrowed with permission directly from Agoglia et al.
2011, for which I am grateful.
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Appendix B – Auditor Reporting Choice33
No CAM condition (received the following paragraph and no CAM excerpt of the audit report)
After careful consideration, in their best judgment, the auditors have decided it is not necessary
to include a discussion of the warranty exposure related to its new product offering as a Critical
Audit Matter in its audit report.
Short CAM and Long CAM Conditions (received the following paragraph plus the applicable
excerpt of the audit report)
After careful consideration, in their best judgment, the auditors have decided it is necessary to
include a discussion of the warranty exposure related to Andarex’s new product offering as a
Critical Audit Matter in its audit report. Following is the language that the auditor intends to use
to address the warranty exposure issue in its audit report:
Excerpt of Audit Report
Critical Audit Matter (Long CAM condition)
The Company has potential warranty obligations associated with a new product
launched during 2012. The Company is required to estimate the exposure and record a
Warranty Liability and associated Warranty Expense in the Consolidated Balance Sheet
and Income Statement as of and for the year ended December 31, 2012, respectively.
Management’s estimate of the warranty exposure incorporates subjective assumptions
that have a high degree of uncertainty. In particular, the percentage of Andarex’s
customers with a defective unit that will actually file a warranty claim could be much
higher than the Company estimated. The Company recorded the warranty liability at the
lower end of the estimate range. Consequently, actual warranty expenses to be incurred
could be significantly higher and earnings could be significantly lower than the amount
recorded.
Critical Audit Matter (Short CAM condition)
The Company has potential warranty obligations associated with a new product
launched during 2012. The Company is required to estimate the exposure and record a
Warranty Liability and associated Warranty Expense in the Consolidated Balance Sheet
and Income Statement as of and for the year ended December 31, 2012, respectively.
Management’s estimate of the warranty exposure incorporates several subjective
assumptions that have a high degree of uncertainty.

33

In order to hold information constant across all conditions, the qualitative information included in the Long CAM
audit report excerpt was included for all conditions within a discussion of the auditor’s decision.
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Appendix C – Examples of Disclosure Elements
FS AMOUNT
The Company has recorded a warranty accrual and related warranty expense of $520,000 for
Product B in the Consolidated Balance Sheet and Statement of Income as of and for the year
ended December 31, 2012, respectively.
RANGE
The Company calculated the potential warranty exposure associated with Product B and
estimates that the exposure is between a minimum of $520,000 and a maximum of $1,560,000 as
of December 31, 2012. The Company recorded warranty expense and reserve for the minimum
amount of the potential exposure range ($520,000) as of December 31, 2012.
RATIONALE
The Company has decided to record warranty expense and reserve for the minimum amount of
the potential exposure range ($520,000) as of December 31, 2012 until the Company has more
experience with actual claims and costs.
KEY ASSUMPTION
The Company’s estimate of warranty exposure is based on a key assumption. Specifically, the
Company has estimated a range for the likelihood that a customer with a defective unit will
actually file a warranty claim of between 20% and 60%.
UNCERTAINTY
The Company’s estimate of warranty exposure for Product B incorporates a subjective
assumption that has a high degree of uncertainty. Specifically, the customer segment for Product
B is new to the Company and it is difficult to estimate the likelihood that a customer with a
defective unit will actually file a warranty claim. Actual warranty expenses to be incurred could
be significantly higher than the amount recorded in the financial statements.
SENSITIVITY
The estimate of warranty exposure depends on the Company’s estimate of the likelihood that a
customer with a defective unit will actually file a warranty claim, which ranges from 20% to
60%. The warranty accrual recorded by the Company is based on a 20% claims rate. Each
increase of 10% in the claims rate would result in additional warranty expense of $260,000
before income taxes.
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Extent of Disclosure

Figure 1 – Predicted Pattern of Results – All Conditions

Strong AC
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No CAM

Short CAM

Long CAM

Figure 2 – Flow of Experiment
Informed Consent
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Auditor Reporting Choice
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Auditor reporting choice
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Post-Experimental
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Figure 3 – Actual Pattern of Results – All Conditions
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Figure 4 – Actual Pattern of Results – No CAM and Long CAM Conditions
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Figure 5 – Actual Pattern of Results – Short CAM and Long CAM Conditions
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Extent of Disclosure

Figure 6 – Actual Pattern of Results for H2 – No CAM and Short CAM Conditions
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Table 1 – Demographic Information
Years of Work Experience
Has Experience as Auditor
Current or Former Audit
Committee Member
Current or Former CPA
Age
Gender

29.2 years
71.8%
23.9%
73.9%
54.0 years
87.9% Male
12.1% Female
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Table 2 – Rating of Extent of Disclosure – All Treatment Conditions
Panel A: Mean (standard deviation) Ratings of Extent of Disclosurea by Audit Committee
Oversight Strength and Auditor Reporting Choice

STRONG
AUDIT
COMMITTEE
OVERSIGHT
STRENGTHc MODERATE

Overall

AUDITOR REPORTING CHOICEb
No CAM
Short CAM
Long CAM
6.95
6.79
8.08
(1.76)
(1.72)
(1.62)
n = 22
n = 24
n = 26
6.52
7.36
6.53
(1.78)
(1.73)
(1.90)
n = 25
n = 25
n = 19
6.72
7.08
7.42
(1.77)
(1.73)
(1.89)
n = 47
n = 49
n = 45

Overall
7.31
(1.77)
n = 72
6.83
(1.82)
n = 69

Panel B: ANCOVA results for Ratings of Extent of Disclosure
Source of Variation
Audit Committee Oversight Strength
Auditor Reporting Choice
Audit Committee Oversight Strength X
Auditor Reporting Choice
Covariate:
Proprietary Informationd

df

SS

F-Value

p-value (1tailed

1
2

9.182
10.616

3.267
1.889

.037
.078

2

30.622

5.448

.003

1

34.909

12.422

.001

Panel C: Planned Contrast for Test of Effect of Auditor Reporting Choice and Audit
Committee Oversight Strength on Ratings of Extent of Disclosure
Model contrast

t-statistic
2.690

e

a

p-value (1-tailed)
.004

Extent of Disclosure was rated on a 10-point scale where 1=minimal disclosure and 10=extensive disclosure.
Auditor Reporting Choice was varied at three levels, No CAM, Short CAM and Long CAM. See Appendix B for
excerpts for each condition.
c
Audit Committee Oversight Strength was varied at two levels, moderate and strong. See Appendix A for excerpts
for each condition.
d
Participants rated how concerned they were that disclosing information about the warranty exposure issue would
reveal proprietary information about the company to its competitors on a 7-point scale where 1 = Very little
concerned and 7 = Very concerned.
e
Contrast coefficients were -1 for Strong AC/No CAM, +2 for Strong AC/ Short CAM, +5 for Strong AC/Long
CAM, -3 for Moderate AC/No CAM, -2 for Moderate AC/ Short CAM, and -1 for Moderate AC/Long CAM.
b

49

Table 3 – Rating of Extent of Disclosure – Comparison of No CAM and Long CAM
conditions
Panel A: Mean (standard deviation) Ratings of Extent of Disclosurea by Audit Committee
Oversight Strength and Auditor Reporting Choice

STRONG
AUDIT
COMMITTEE
OVERSIGHT
STRENGTHc MODERATE

Overall

AUDITOR REPORTING
CHOICEb
No CAM
Long CAM
6.95
8.08
(1.76)
(1.62)
n = 22
n = 26
6.52
6.53
(1.78)
(1.90)
n = 25
n = 19
6.72
7.42
(1.77)
(1.89)
n = 47
n = 45

Overall
7.56
(1.76)
n = 48
6.52
(1.81)
n = 44

Panel B: ANCOVA results for Ratings of Extent of Disclosure
Source of Variation

df

Audit Committee Oversight Strength
Auditor Reporting Choice
Audit Committee Oversight Strength X
Auditor Reporting Choice
Covariate:
Proprietary Informationd

SS

F-Value

p-value (1tailed

1
1

28.442
9.486

10.730
3.579

.001
.031

1

7.421

2.800

.049

1

41.167

15.531

.000

Panel C: Planned Contrast for Test of Effect of Auditor Reporting Choice and Audit
Committee Oversight Strength on Ratings of Extent of Disclosure
t-statistic
3.507

Model contraste
a

p-value (1-tailed)
.001

Extent of Disclosure was rated on a 10-point scale where 1=minimal disclosure and 10=extensive disclosure.
Auditor Reporting Choice was varied at three levels, No CAM, Short CAM and Long CAM. See Appendix B for
excerpts for each condition.
c
Audit Committee Oversight Strength was varied at two levels, moderate and strong. See Appendix A for excerpts
for each condition.
d
Participants rated how concerned they were that disclosing information about the warranty exposure issue would
reveal proprietary information about the company to its competitors on a 7-point scale where 1 = Very little
concerned and 7 = Very concerned.
e
Contrast coefficients were -1 for Strong AC/No CAM, +5 for Strong AC/Long CAM, -3 for Moderate AC/No
CAM, and -1 for Moderate AC/Long CAM.
b
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Table 4 – Rating of Extent of Disclosure – Comparison of Short CAM and Long CAM
conditions
Panel A: Mean (standard deviation) Ratings of Extent of Disclosurea by Audit Committee
Oversight Strength and Auditor Reporting Choice

STRONG
AUDIT
COMMITTEE
OVERSIGHT
STRENGTHc MODERATE

Overall

AUDITOR REPORTING CHOICEb
Short CAM
Long CAM
6.79
8.08
(1.72)
(1.62)
n = 24
n = 26
7.36
6.53
(1.73)
(1.90)
n = 25
n = 19
7.08
7.42
(1.73)
(1.89)
n = 49
n = 45

Overall
7.46
(1.78)
n = 50
7.00
(1.83)
n = 44

Panel B: ANCOVA results for Ratings of Extent of Disclosure
Source of Variation

df

Audit Committee Oversight Strength
Auditor Reporting Choice
Audit Committee Oversight Strength X
Auditor Reporting Choice
Covariate:
Proprietary Informationd

SS

F-Value

p-value (1tailed

1
1

5.855
0.383

2.009
0.131

.080
.359

1

28.913

9.921

.001

1

10.916

3.745

.028

Panel C: Planned Contrast for Test of Effect of Auditor Reporting Choice and Audit
Committee Oversight Strength on Ratings of Extent of Disclosure
t-statistic
2.066

Model contraste
a

p-value (1-tailed)
.021

Extent of Disclosure was rated on a 10-point scale where 1=minimal disclosure and 10=extensive disclosure.
Auditor Reporting Choice was varied at three levels, No CAM, Short CAM and Long CAM. See Appendix B for
excerpts for each condition.
c
Audit Committee Oversight Strength was varied at two levels, moderate and strong. See Appendix A for excerpts
for each condition.
d
Participants rated how concerned they were that disclosing information about the warranty exposure issue would
reveal proprietary information about the company to its competitors on a 7-point scale where 1 = Very little
concerned and 7 = Very concerned.
e
Contrast coefficients were +1 for Strong AC/Short CAM, +4 for Strong AC/Long CAM, -3 for Moderate AC/Short
CAM, and -2 for Moderate AC/Long CAM.
b
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Table 5 – Rating of Extent of Disclosure – Comparison of No CAM and Short CAM
conditions
Panel A: Mean (standard deviation) Ratings of Extent of Disclosurea by Audit Committee
Oversight Strength and Auditor Reporting Choice

STRONG
AUDIT
COMMITTEE
OVERSIGHT
STRENGTHc MODERATE

Overall

AUDITOR REPORTING
CHOICEb
No CAM
Short CAM
6.95
6.79
(1.76)
(1.72)
n = 22
n = 24
6.52
7.36
(1.78)
(1.73)
n = 25
n = 25
6.72
7.08
(1.77)
(1.73)
n = 47
n = 49

Overall
6.87
(1.72)
n = 46
6.94
(1.79)
n = 50

Panel B: ANCOVA results for Ratings of Extent of Disclosure
Source of Variation

df

Audit Committee Oversight Strength
Auditor Reporting Choice
Audit Committee Oversight Strength X
Auditor Reporting Choice
Covariate:
Proprietary Informationd

SS

F-Value

p-value (2tailed)

1
1

.086
6.817

.030
2.404

.862
.124

1

8.115

2.862

.094

1

22.898

8.076

.006

Panel C: Planned Contrast for Test of Effect of Auditor Reporting Choice and Audit
Committee Oversight Strength on Ratings of Extent of Disclosure
Model contrast

t-statistic
-0.082

e

a

p-value (2-tailed)
.935

Extent of Disclosure was rated on a 10-point scale where 1=minimal disclosure and 10=extensive disclosure.
Auditor Reporting Choice was varied at three levels, No CAM, Short CAM and Long CAM. See Appendix B for
excerpts for each condition.
c
Audit Committee Oversight Strength was varied at two levels, moderate and strong. See Appendix A for excerpts
for each condition.
d
Participants rated how concerned they were that disclosing information about the warranty exposure issue would
reveal proprietary information about the company to its competitors on a 7-point scale where 1 = Very little
concerned and 7 = Very concerned.
e
Contrast coefficients were +1 for Strong AC/No CAM, +4 for Strong AC/Short CAM, -3 for Moderate AC/No
CAM, and -2 for Moderate AC/Short CAM.
b
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Table 6 – Summary of Disclosure Element Ratings – Comparison of all CAM conditions
Disclosure Element

AC Strength
Strong
Moderate

No
CAM
7.55
7.76

Short CAM Long
CAM
7.56
8.15
8.08
8.11

FS Amounta

p-value of planned
contrasth (1-tailed)
.414

Rangeb

Strong
Moderate

4.27
4.68

4.44
4.68

6.00
4.84

.082

Rationalec

Strong
Moderate

4.32
5.04

4.36
4.56

5.69
5.37

.234

Key Assumptiond

Strong
Moderate

4.14
4.16

4.28
4.56

6.27
4.68

.010

Uncertaintye

Strong
Moderate

8.23
7.84

7.84
8.40

8.08
8.05

.432

Sensitivityf

Strong
Moderate

5.00
5.28

4.24
3.84

6.25
3.95

.029

Mean of Elementsg

Strong
Moderate

5.58
5.79

5.45
5.69

6.74
5.83

.036

Each of the six elements were rated by participants based on the likelihood they would choose to disclose the
element. Ratings were given on a 10-point scale where 1 = Definitely Not Disclose and 10 = Definitely Disclose.
FS Amount - the amounts reported in the financial statements regarding the company’s warranty estimate.
Range - the range of the company’s warranty estimate.
c
Rationale - the rationale for the recorded amount.
d
Key Assumption - a description of the key uncertain assumption in the warranty estimate.
e
Uncertainty - a description of uncertainty in the estimate.
f
Sensitivity - a sensitivity analysis of the warranty estimate based on movement in the key uncertain assumption.
g
Mean of Elements – The mean of the preceding six disclosure elements.
h
Contrast coefficients were -1 for Strong AC/No CAM, +2 for Strong AC/ Short CAM, +5 for Strong AC/Long
CAM, -3 for Moderate AC/No CAM, -2 for Moderate AC/ Short CAM, and -1 for Moderate AC/Long CAM.
a

b
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Table 7 – Summary of Disclosure Element Ratings – Comparison of No CAM and Long
CAM conditions
Disclosure Element

AC Strength

No CAM

Long CAM

p-value of planned
contrasth (1-tailed)
.291

FS Amounta

Strong
Moderate

7.55
7.76

8.15
8.11

Rangeb

Strong
Moderate

4.27
4.68

6.00
4.84

.052

Rationalec

Strong
Moderate

4.32
5.04

5.69
5.37

.186

Key Assumptiond

Strong
Moderate

4.14
4.16

6.27
4.68

.003

Uncertaintye

Strong
Moderate

8.23
7.84

8.08
8.05

.418

Sensitivityf

Strong
Moderate

5.00
5.28

6.25
3.95

.030

Mean of Elementsg

Strong
Moderate

5.58
5.79

6.74
5.83

.016

Each of the six elements were rated by participants based on the likelihood they would choose to disclose the
element. Ratings were given on a 10-point scale where 1 = Definitely Not Disclose and 10 = Definitely Disclose.
FS Amount - the amounts reported in the financial statements regarding the company’s warranty estimate.
Range - the range of the company’s warranty estimate.
c
Rationale - the rationale for the recorded amount.
d
Key Assumption - a description of the key uncertain assumption in the warranty estimate.
e
Uncertainty - a description of uncertainty in the estimate.
f
Sensitivity - a sensitivity analysis of the warranty estimate based on movement in the key uncertain assumption.
g
Mean of Elements – The mean of the preceding six disclosure elements.
h
Contrast coefficients were -1 for Strong AC/No CAM, +5 for Strong AC/Long CAM, -3 for Moderate AC/No
CAM, and -1 for Moderate AC/Long CAM.
a

b
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Table 8 – Summary of Disclosure Element Ratings – Comparison of Short CAM and Long
CAM conditions
Disclosure Element

AC Strength

Short CAM

Long CAM

p-value of planned
contrasth (1-tailed)
.463

FS Amounta

Strong
Moderate

7.56
8.08

8.15
8.11

Rangeb

Strong
Moderate

4.44
4.68

6.00
4.84

.108

Rationalec

Strong
Moderate

4.36
4.56

5.69
5.37

.237

Key Assumptiond

Strong
Moderate

4.28
4.56

6.27
4.68

.032

Uncertaintye

Strong
Moderate

7.84
8.40

8.08
8.05

.321

Sensitivityf

Strong
Moderate

4.24
3.84

6.25
3.95

.002

Mean of Elementsg

Strong
Moderate

5.45
5.69

6.74
5.83

.038

Each of the six elements were rated by participants based on the likelihood they would choose to disclose the
element. Ratings were given on a 10-point scale where 1 = Definitely Not Disclose and 10 = Definitely Disclose.
FS Amount - the amounts reported in the financial statements regarding the company’s warranty estimate.
Range - the range of the company’s warranty estimate.
c
Rationale - the rationale for the recorded amount.
d
Key Assumption - a description of the key uncertain assumption in the warranty estimate.
e
Uncertainty - a description of uncertainty in the estimate.
f
Sensitivity - a sensitivity analysis of the warranty estimate based on movement in the key uncertain assumption.
g
Mean of Elements – The mean of the preceding six disclosure elements.
h
Contrast coefficients were +1 for Strong AC/Short CAM, +4 for Strong AC/Long CAM, -3 for Moderate AC/Short
CAM, and -2 for Moderate AC/Long CAM.
a

b
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Table 9 – Summary of Disclosure Element Ratings – Comparison of No CAM and Short
CAM conditions
Disclosure Element

AC Strength

No CAM

Short CAM

p-value of planned
contrasth (2-tailed)
.605

FS Amounta

Strong
Moderate

7.55
7.76

7.56
8.08

Rangeb

Strong
Moderate

4.27
4.68

4.44
4.68

.715

Rationalec

Strong
Moderate

4.32
5.04

4.36
4.56

.504

Key Assumptiond

Strong
Moderate

4.14
4.16

4.28
4.56

.920

Uncertaintye

Strong
Moderate

8.23
7.84

7.84
8.40

.788

Sensitivityf

Strong
Moderate

5.00
5.28

4.24
3.84

.622

Mean of Elementsg

Strong
Moderate

5.58
5.79

5.45
5.69

.505

Each of the six elements were rated by participants based on the likelihood they would choose to disclose the
element. Ratings were given on a 10-point scale where 1 = Definitely Not Disclose and 10 = Definitely Disclose.
FS Amount - the amounts reported in the financial statements regarding the company’s warranty estimate.
Range - the range of the company’s warranty estimate.
c
Rationale - the rationale for the recorded amount.
d
Key Assumption - a description of the key uncertain assumption in the warranty estimate.
e
Uncertainty - a description of uncertainty in the estimate.
f
Sensitivity - a sensitivity analysis of the warranty estimate based on movement in the key uncertain assumption.
g
Mean of Elements – The mean of the preceding six disclosure elements.
h
Contrast coefficients were +1 for Strong AC/No CAM, +4 for Strong AC/Short CAM, -3 for Moderate AC/No
CAM, and -2 for Moderate AC/Short CAM.
a

b
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